Abstract
However, this was in 1991, when brute-force attacks on passwords were not as common as they are today. And the advice to use mixed-case passwords is useless for Novel1 and VMS systems, where passwords are case insensitive [2] .
More recent advice is typified by this page from Information Services at the University of Kent at
Canterbury [3]:
"When choosing a password, it [sic] really should Not contain words found in a dictionary. Crackers have access to very large on-line dictionaries (with more than 100,000 words), in a number of languages! Not be a name of a friend, relative film 
The need for good passwords
Other common recommendations include choosing a password with mixed upper-case and lower-case letters, br mixed leners and digi;;.
Passwords are the first line of defense against intrusion
While it is obvious that you don't want to choose a into a computer system. Users have an ethical imperative to choose good Passwords protect the sensitive password that an inmder could easily guess, m a y users information of others, and system administrators have a don,t appreciate the potency of the arsenal an anacker system administrators provide advice to their users on recommend Dolvsv,labic dictionarv words as responsibility 10 see that they do. Toward that end, many might deploy against them. In the 1980s, it was 0-7803-7824-0/02/$10.00 82002 IEEE.
. , , passwords, hut that is no longer prudent. Dictionaries of 60,000 words were compiled as long ago as 1990, and more recent schemes test permutations of the words, including substituting special characters for letters (e.g.,
"$" for "s", or "0" for "a"), or capitalizing one or two non-initial characters [4] . A cracker who gets access to a Unix password file, for example, can try these techniques at his leisure. There are, of course, more modem techniques than Unix's, but even some of these are subject to offline attacks (including the widely used Kerberos IV [5]). Few first-time users will know bow strong a system's security is when they select their passwords, and hence they should choose a strong password. Thus it is recommended that passwords be at least 8 characters long and not he words found in a dictionary, or any obvious permutation of them.
But a password must also be easy to memorize. It's inconvenient to have to pull out a piece of paper every time one logs in, and, in any event, it is also a security risk, because the paper might be lost, or read by a bystander. A common suggestion [Z, 3.6 , 71 is to use the initial letters of words in a phrase that you can remember, e.g., "0, say, can you see by the dawn's early light" yields "Oscysbtdel".
The problem of multiple accounts
If everyone had just a single account, the catch-phrase acronym approach would come close to solving the problem-at least if the passwords were 2 8 Characters and (unlike the one above) weren't derived from the lyrics of well known proverbs or songs, which might someday be compiled into a hacker dictionary. But nowadays, average people have passwords for one or more computer accounts and dozens of Web sites. Systems tend to have different rules for constructing passwords, some of them quite arbitrary.
-Unix systems permit passwords of unlimited length to be typed, but only the first eight characters are significant [2J, which converts some seemingly secure passwords into insecure ones, e.g., "Carolina71 Duke59" becomes simply "Carolina".
-TIAA-CREF [SI, the leading provider of retirement plans for college faculty, requires passwords to be between 4 and 7 characters. Even the catch-phrase acronym would be rejected by certain sites, which require that all passwords contain at least one special character.
Compounding the difficulty is a similarly inconsistent set of rules for constructing usemames, with sites having different minimum and maximum lengths, and some allowing only alphanumerics, or disallowing certain special characters. These rules combine to make it virtually impossible for users to remember their logidpassword combinations without writing them down, either on paper or in a file. lndeed, Dbamija and Pemg [IO] found that more than a quarter of users failed to recall not only their passwords, but also their usernames.
Thus, it is impossible to use the same usemame, password, or username/password combination for all sites to which one has access, This helps diminish a serious security risk, since some sites may store passwords in plaintext accessible to administrators. For example, I was distressed to discover earlier this year that a help-line support person at my long-distance provider was able to quote me a password that I couldn't recall. If that had been a password I used on other sites, he could have read On the other band, writing down a list of one's accounts and passwords may even be a greater security risk, because anyone who comes into possession of such a list will automatically be able to access the victim's accounts, without having to &mess which institutions hold them. This risk is widespread, as evidenced by one study 1121 that found that 50% of users wrote their passwords down. We will return to some proposed solutions later, but first, let us consider the implications o f two other schemes for protecting passwords: the requirement that they be changed at regular intervals, and "locking out" accounts after a certain number of unsuccessful login attempts.
Lifetime limits and lockouts
System administrators frequently require users to change their passworus at regular intervals. This is intended to increase security by denying an intruder longterm access to an account. Adams and Sasse [I21 identify several problems with lifetime limits. When required to change passwords frequently, users are eventually forced into using less memorable passwords, or get confused as to which password they are actually using, either of which increases the tendency to write passwords down. Or, in an effort to remember, they choose progressively simpler passwords, which are less secure. This tends to make users-few of whom appreciate security risks anywaymore cynical about security in general. Adams and Sasse conclude, "Although change regimes are employed to reduce the impact of an undetected security breach, our findings suggest they reduce the overall password security in an organization."
Lockouts are a technique to prevent password discovery through brute-force techniques. After a certain number of unsuccessful attempts, the system will lock up an account and deny further access, even if the correct password is subsequently entered. Intervention by the system administrator is needed to re-enable the account. Three unsuccessful guesses is a typical limit [5]. This is quite reasonable in the case of a user with a single account and no password-lifetime limit. But in an environment where a user has numerous accounts with different passwords, it is a powerful incentive to write down a list of those passwords rather than guess at them when trying to log in.
Three guesses is probably an unnecessarily low threshold anyway. Zviran and Haga [14] performed an experiment where users chose "cognitive" passwordspasswords based on personal facts, interest, and opinions that are likely to be recalled by a user. Most such passwords are very insecure by today's standards. Yet these passwords were guessable only 29% of the time by the "significant others" in the users' lives-even though the significant others were told what fact the password was based on (e.g., the name of the elementary school from which the user graduated). A clear implication of this study is that an intruder would have very little chance of guessing a user's password in the first few guesses.
An alternative technique to foil password-guessing is to introduce a delay of a few seconds between attempts.
This alternative seems to be unlikely to induce users to write passwords down, since a forgetful user is likely to need a few seconds' think time between atlempts. Rubin [5] suggests combining this technique with lockouts for greater security. But if lockouts are to be used, the threshold could be set high enough (say, one to two dozen attempts) so that it does not create an incentive to write down passwords.
Taken together, multiple accounts with lifetime limits and lockouts could produce the worst password security of all. Without reusing the same password across multiple sites, a user would have no way of remembering which password applied to which site at which time. Using the same password for all sites would help a little, but since users may have accounts at Web sites they visit infrequently, they would still need to remember a succession of "old" passwords. This, coupled with the inability to try more than two or three passwords before being locked out, would very nearly guarantee that users would write down all their passwords and keep the lists readily accessible. Intruders would know this, and the theft of such lists would become a major security problem.
Wallets
The proliferation of passwords has given rise to a host of software applications designed to help users manage their accounts. Collectively called "wallets," they come in two different varieties.
The first is a usemame/password repository, which is essentially an encrypted file kept on your computer that holds information you need to log into your various accounts. While undoubtedly a convenience for users, these programs do not completely solve the problem of achieving password security. They are only as secure as the password the user chooses for the wallet and the physical security of the user's. computer. Network accounts and Web sites may have rules that require strong passwords, but a user can circumvent these by using a weak password for the password wallet. Though such passwords are not normally passed over a network, they may be susceptible to virus attacks that would expose them to an interloper. Anyone who has physical access to a computer running a wallet program would have access to all the passwords, so users would have to remember to lock their computer or quit the application when walking away from their desks [19] .
The other style of wallet program holds not only passwords, but other information that a user might need in accessing a Web site, and aims to facilitate moving from site to site without re-entering information. The most prominent application in this category is MicrosoA's Passport [20], which is targeted at consumer-oriented shopping sites. The Passport server maintains personal information about the customer, including such items as credit-card numbers and shoe size, and passes this information on, with permission, to sites that the consumer visits. The client begins by connecting to the merchant's site.
When the customer needs to authenticate, the merchant server redirects the user to a Passport server. The user logs in at the Passport server, which then redirects the user back to the end server [ 5 ] .
Passport does not work with all sites, only with participating merchant sites, so the user still needs to keep track of usemames and passwords to other sites. There is also the possibility that an intruder could observe the network between the client's browser and the merchant's Web server and impersonate the Passport server in order to read the user% Passport password. This is possible because Microsoft, in an effort to make the service as general as possible, did not protect the redirection at the beginning of a Passport session by SSL [SI. This is one of several risks in its protocol [21].
One possible approach
One approach to devising passwords that are different for each site, secure, and memorable, is suggested by Craig Busse [22] . He suggests using a password embedding an anagram of the site name: "E.g., take the first 2 letters of the URL (or user ID or hostname or whatever you are logging onto), in reverse order as the first two letters of the password and your OW initials, again in reverse order, as the last two leners of the password. Insert digits 01234 ... as needed in the middle to satisfy any length requirements."
He suggests that readers choose their own strategy similar to, but not identical to that. This seems to be more secure than using the same password on all sites, though it would easily be crackable by an attacker that managed to gather enough of a user's passwords to spot the pattern. It also does not deal with change requirements, but those could be handled by varying the filler text to, e.g., encode the month that the password was changed. Obviously, this sacrifices much of the value of changing passwords in order to combat undetected security breaches, but at least it does not reduce security by tempting users to write their passwords down.
Recommendations
Both users and administrators have ethical responsibilities to maintain good password security.
Users have obligations not only to themselves, but also to their fellow users, whose security may be compromised if an intruder gains access to the computer system. They should use passwords that do not appear in the dictionary, that are not too short, that do not encode any of their personal OJ account attributes, and that follow any other relevant rules from Section 1. They should consider encoding site names, dates, and other infomation in passwords, as outlined in Section 5 . Administrators have the primary responsibility for keeping their system and network secure. They should make sure users are aware of the attributes of a good password. They should refrain from imposing unrealistic restrictions that invite circumvention, as these leave the system vulnerable and promote cynicism about security.
Specifically, systems should avoid restrictions on passwords that are motivated by programming convenience rather than security. Thus, the maximum password length should be at least thirty characters, or should he unconstrained altogether. No characters should be prohibited from appearing in passwords; full Unicode should be allowed if the system supports it. Systems should rarely impose a maximum lifetime on passwords.
One exception might be a security-critical system in daily use by most of its users; if change regimes are imposed only on the one system that its users use most frequently, they will be more manageable than if users are required to change passwords on multiple systems at varying intervals. Similarly, lockouts after failed login attempts should be used sparingly if at all. Enforced delays afier unsuccessful attempts serve the same purpose, and are not likely to induce users to write down passwords.
Rules on what kinds of characters a password should contain are more justifiable than rules on what characters it should not contain. But, rather than mandating the use of uppercase, digits, or special characters, it is probably better for a system to evaluate each new password against some metric and reject those that are too weak, telling the user why they were rejected. This avoids proscribing, say, a 20-character phrase with idiosyncratic word breaks just because it does not contain a special character.
Summary
Maintaining password security involves striking a delicate balance between having enough rules to maintain good security and not having so many that users will take evasive action that compromises security. To date, most of the emphasis in the literature has been on having strong enough rules. Only two articles the author encountered 112, 191 focused on the pitfalls of having too-stringent rules. True security, however, is an attribute of the entire human-computer environment, not just what is stored digitally. Future work in this area should not leave the human out of the equation.
